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In the apocryphal exchange between an American anxious to 
improve the aesthetics of his yard and an archetypical Englishman, 
the American asks, "How can I have a lawn as beautiful as yours?" 
The Englishman's reply: "Start growing your lawn six hundred 
years ago!" The most effective advice on how to grow constitu-
tional democracy in the countries that we probably inaccurately 
group together as belonging to Eastern Europe might take a similar 
tack. Successful constitutional democracy in the West, particularly 
in the United States, Britain, and a number of Commonwealth na-
tions, did not sprout all at once. It grew, with sporadic freedom-
enhancing measures that fertilized its soil, from at least the time of 
Magna Charta in 1215. Not only were there many periods ~uring 
which constitutional democracy was fragile or vulnerable, but any 
serious reader of history must be aware that its stable maintenance 
is unusual and that it must constantly be tended in order to assure 
its survival and flourishing. Most importantly, it must be tended 
not just by the government agents of the populace, but by the people 
themselves through their participation and their firm, preferably 
peaceful, insistence on its preservation. 
The establishment of constitutional government is both an ide-
alistic and a practical undertaking. It is idealistic in its recognition 
that all human beings are entitled by virtue of their humanity to 
certain basic freedoms and to government that operates in the inter-
est of their welfare. It is mundanely practical insofar as it is pre-
mised on the recognition of human ambition and self-interest, and 
the dangers that those human qualities present when combined with 
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the bestowal of political power. It is also intensely practical in its 
search for mechanisms of government structure and enforcement of 
procedural and substantive freedoms that successfully will constrain 
the abuse of government power without disabling it entirely. 
By "establishing constitutional government," I mean not just 
the creation of a written document that purports to create the polit-
ical structure of a nation and guarantee rights to its people, but 
"constitutionalism" in the sense of meaningful and effective adher-
ence to constitutional norms of democratic organization and the 
protection of individual liberty, even when the cost of that adher-
ence is the sacrifice of what seems temporarily expedient. To hold 
to a fundamental and stable framework of democratic, liberty-re-
specting values despite the most tumultuous of policy disagreements 
among a nation's contending factions is the essence of the constitu-
tional spirit. 
Much ink has been spilled arguing against the admittedly an-
timajoritarian features of constitutional, as distinguished from pure, 
democracy .1 One powerful form of rebuttal to that position invokes 
the primacy of securing the "Blessings of Liberty" above even dem-
ocratic control. Not the grace of government, democratically or 
otherwise selected, but the inalienable and natural rights of human 
beings, are the source of our rights to freedom of conscience, to 
privacy, or to religious choice, for example. The "moral fact that a 
person belongs to himself and not to others nor to society as a 
whole"z establishes that a person's natural rights precede the state 
and that government, even democratic government, must justify its 
need to interfere with natural rights. Government cannot dispense 
what it does not rightly hold, and even a democratic positivism 
therefore cannot dispense or condition basic human freedoms. 
Unlike the anti-positivist natural rights position, a second line 
of rebuttal assumes the relevance of the democratic standard. It 
insists, however, that what is antimajoritarian is not necessarily an-
tidemocratic. Indeed, in choosing what elements to establish as 
minimum constitutional conditions that cannot be altered without 
invoking a legitimate constitutional amendment process, those ele-
ments that crucially support the long-term sustenance of demo-
cratic forms of government-such as rights of political 
participation, and freedom of speech, press, and association-must 
be put beyond the reach of current majorities precisely in order to 
I. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 633, 636-
43 (1991 ), for a probing response to this claim. My discussion here borrows heavily from 
Sunstein's useful account. 
2. Charles Fried, Correspondence, 6 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 288 (1977). 
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preserve a vital range of democratic decisionmaking by future ma-
jorities. Expressive freedoms, including freedom of inquiry, thus 
are justified both as natural rights of the person and as instrumental 
rights in the maintenance of a healthy, democratic regime, and so 
the guarantee of their protection is preeminently indispensable in 
establishing constitutional government. I can do no better than to 
quote Justice Hugo Black of the United States Supreme Court: 
Freedom to speak and to write about public questions is as im-
portant to the life of our government as is the heart to the human 
body. In fact, the privilege is the heart of our government. If 
that heart be weakened, the result is debilitation; if it be stilled, 
the result is death.3 
More particularly, the absolute freedom of individuals to criti-
cize their government must be guaranteed if constitutional democ-
racy is to survive. That is why it is so disheartening to discover that 
the most recent draft of the Romanian Constitution apparently 
would, among other questionable limits on freedom of expression, 
allow the government to restrict the right to defame the country or 
the government.4 As a distinguished American law professor first 
wrote a generation ago: 
[P]olitical freedom ends when government can use its powers and 
its courts to silence its critics. [T]he presence or absence in the 
law of the concept of seditious libel defines the society .... If ... 
it makes seditious libel an offense, it is not a free society, no mat-
ter what its other characteristics.s 
Structural elements of constitutions that depart from pure ma-
joritarianism--or even from pure proportional representation-may 
also be justified as strategies for preserving liberty, by dividing and 
balancing power. When a bicameral legislature's second house is 
not elected strictly according to population, as when it is appor-
tioned by constituent sub-sovereigns of a federal nation, the design 
is to introduce a different perspective that will promote more pru-
dent deliberation from distinctive viewpoints and offset the possibil-
ity of majority tyranny. Separating the legislative, executive, and 
judicial powers, and dividing legislative competence between na-
tional and constituent republics or states, are also designed to estab-
3. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 301-02 
(1941). 
4. Summary Report of Proceedings, Central and Eastern European Law Initiative 
Technical Assistance Workshop on the Draft Romanian Constitution 2 (August 19-23, 
1991). 
5. Harry Kalven, Jr., A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America 63 (H~rper 
& Row, 1988). 
174 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 9:171 
lish competing centers of power to foster more sustained reflection 
before government's coercive power is brought to bear on the citi-
zenry and to thwart the concentration of power in one or a small set 
of hands that is the very definition of tyranny. These multiple cen-
ters of power, superimposed on the innate ambitions of human per-
sonalities, can act to prevent domination by one center because of 
the resistance of the others. The theory of constitutionalism rejects 
the romantic notion of utopian societies consisting of altruistic indi-
viduals. It does not assume cooperation for the good of the people, 
but creates a structure that forces cooperation, dialogue, and com-
promise. It presupposes that the different centers possess real 
power, for without that condition the practice will not match the 
theory. That is only one reason why it has been so crucial in Amer-
ican constitutionalism, at least, that the judicial branch was made 
independent by providing the appointed justices with life tenure and 
guarantees that their salaries will not be reduced-in retaliation for 
decisions unpopular with other government officials or for any 
other reason. 
The arresting notion, recently elaborated by Professor Sun-
stein, that there are some subjects whose legislative examination 
might be so debilitating to the political process that they should be 
constitutionalized beyond the reach of politics also deserves men-
tion.6 Sunstein suggests that keeping potentially explosive and in-
tractable issues such as private property or religion off the political 
agenda by constitutional prohibitions on their infringement may fa-
cilitate the political process by limiting factional conflict in 
government. 
A little elaboration of the religion example may be helpful. Be-
sides acting as an additional support for the constitutional right 
freely to exercise one's religion, the American Constitution's first 
amendment ban on government establishment of religion was 
designed to liberate politics from religious strife. The "belief that a 
union of government and religion tends to destroy government and 
to degrade religion"7 has animated Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence. The Bulgarian draft constitution, by denominating the East-
em Orthodox Church as the "traditional Bulgarian religion,"8 and 
the Polish government's introduction of religion into public school 
activities,9 dangerously ignore the pragmatic underpinnings of that 
6. Sunstein, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 639-40 (cited in note 1). 
7. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962). 
8. Constitutional Reform in Bulgaria: A Summary Report of a Workshop, The Ameri-
can Bar Association Central and Eastern European Law Initiative (CEELI) 3 (June 19-22, 
1991) ("CEELI Report"). 
9. Andrzej Rapaczynski, Constitutional Politics in Poland: A Report on the Constitu-
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belief. 
That departures from leaving all matters to majoritarian polit-
ical processes are sometimes justified to secure human freedom or to 
facilitate democratic rule does not mean, of course, that any lesser 
justification will do, or that any such justification ought not to be 
scrutinized carefully before adopting particular norms as constitu-
tionally fundamental and so beyond the reach of ordinary politics. 
A constitutional democracy is legitimate only insofar as the govern-
ment derives its power from the consent of the governed, and the 
necessity of having agents of the people exercise government power 
introduces the separate interests of government officials in the main-
tenance of their own positions as an additional factor needing con-
trol-a factor surely known all too well among the peoples of 
Central and Eastern Europe. Controlling even democratically 
elected agents by effectively rendering them subject to the rule of 
law is a key ingredient of constitutional democracy. Assuming the 
will exists to make democratic politics and respect for human rights 
the norm, and to establish power-allocating arrangements that will 
effectuate those aims, we need to address the realities of internal and 
international context in which the constitutional creation process 
must take place, and the specific content of the provisions that 
ought to be built into each country's constitutional framework. 
Neither nation by nation analysis, nor a comprehensive delineation 
of what a workable constitution should include, is possible here. 
Some limited observations may be of interest, however. 
A realist must begin with the conditions in which those who 
would create constitutional democracy find themselves. In Central 
and Eastern Europe the conditions are hardly ideal. The transition 
from authoritarian communist systems to free democratic regimes 
must overcome significant impediments. Transition is itself always 
difficult. In this instance, economic impoverishment and uncer-
tainty about the nature of the future economic system-especially 
the scope and intensity of the commitment to privatization and the 
development of a market economy-must be resolved at the same 
time that political reform occurs. to 
tiona/ Committee of the Polish Parliament, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 595, 606 n.24 (1991) ("In 
August 1990, two weeks before the beginning of the school year and without any prior con-
sultations with Parliament. the government issued a regulation introducing religion in public 
schools, despite the fact that public opinion polls had indicated that most parents opposed the 
move. [Although it removed the issue from the presidential election campaign,] very little 
attention seems to have been paid to its long-term consequences on the separation of church 
and state.") 
10. See Richard A. Epstein, All Quiet on the Eastern Front, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 555, 557 
( 1991) ("Eastern Europe faces three problems: the first is that of transition; the second is the 
pressing need to deal with the questions of racial and ethnic divisions; and the third is its 
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One or the other would be challenge enough. Simultaneous 
political and economic reform is doubly challenging. It is not that 
one should be delayed in favor of the other; that would risk the 
accomplishment of neither. Economic freedom and vitality, on the 
one hand, and political liberty and democratic vigor, on the other, 
are too interconnected to believe that constitutionalism can take 
hold without both. One need not embrace the view that capitalism 
and its failings should remain virtually unregulated to agree with 
the general point that "[p]olitical and intellectual freedom cannot 
be achieved without economic freedom." 11 Indeed, it is worth re-
flecting on the degree to which the habit of freedom, independence, 
and responsibility that accompanies the liberty to choose how one 
will employ one's private property and talents in economic pursuits 
reinforces expectations of freedom in other personal and social pur-
suits-and vice-versa. But the enormity of the task of transition 
should not escape attention. 
The challenge of peacefully containing and resolving long-re-
pressed ethnic and cultural tensions in nations without a tolerance 
for multi-cultural pluralism is also formidable. Even in the United 
States, with its long history of stable democracy, these are formida-
ble challenges. When heterogeneity of language and culture assume 
more significant proportions, the difficulties of constitutional resolu-
tion increase dramatically, as Canada's recent experience with sepa-
ratist sentiment in Quebec makes clear. The draft provisions of 
Bulgaria's constitution that would restrict the political activities of 
ethnic and religious groups12 unfortunately succumb to the tempta-
tion of repressing these differences rather than resolving them 
through inclusion by guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for 
all, or by other means. Both for reasons of respect for human rights 
and for promoting democratic stability in multi-ethnic nations, the 
proposed Bulgarian approach is exactly backwards. 
Adding to the difficulties of Eastern European transition to 
constitutional democracy is the absence of competitive established 
inability to forge a durable social consensus on the necessity of strong institutions of private 
property for both political liberty and economic growth.'') 
II. Alex Kozinski, The Dark Lessons of Utopia, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 575, 58 I (1991), 
citing Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (U. of Chi. Press, 1982). Timothy Garton 
Ash, in his perceptive chronicle, The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of '89 Witnessed in 
Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague 148-49 (Random House, 1990), captured the beliefs of 
the "opposition movements throughout East Central Europe" by suggesting that what they 
were saying was: 
Civil rights and property rights, economic freedom and political freedom, financial 
independence and intellectual independence, each supports the other. So, yes, we 
want to be citizens, but we also want to be middle-class, in the senses that the 
majority of citizens in the more fortunate half of Europe are middle-class. 
12. CEELI Report at 2 (cited in note 8). 
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political parties, experienced democratic movements, or organized 
defenders of human rights. That is not entirely as true of some 
countries in the region, such as CzechoslovakiaD and Poland, as it 
is of others. Yet one of the ravages of Communist domination was 
surely the enfeebling or destruction of organized opposition groups. 
More generally, the absence of a history incorporating strong ele-
ments of constitutional democracy, checked powers, and the rule of 
law makes growing the green grass of liberty a prodigious 
undertaking. 
Although there surely are other major barriers to surmount, 
the last one I will mention is the potential military insecurity of the 
region. The task of democratic reform must be complicated to the 
extent that military power occupies a prominent place on a nation's 
agenda. Because of economic cost, the historical truth that military 
needs are often satisfied at the expense of individual or political free-
dom, and the human inability simultaneously to wage or be pre-
pared for war and to perfect democracy, a primary focus on 
military security will drain the energy needed to build a workable 
constitutionalism. Among other unfortunate lessons, the recent ex-
perience in Yugoslavia tends to confirm this one. 
Correctly reminding us that eighteenth century arguments in 
favor of ratification of the proposed United States Constitution pri-
marily concentrated on the "geostrategic" advantages of union in 
combatting external threats and eliminating the potential for armed 
hostilities among the States, Professor Amar, addressing the current 
situation in Eastern Europe, contends that "the success of democ-
racy in individual countries depends heavily on demilitarization of 
the entire region."J4 He further suggests that the "key point for 
Europeans today is that internal constitutional reform is not 
enough."1s Instead, "[c]ontinental legal institutions like the EEC 
and NATO must be developed or expanded to create a continental 
environment conducive to commerce and demilitarization."J6 
However much I agree that "economic cooperation and demili-
tarization went hand in hand under the Federalist [United States] 
Constitution[,]" 11 and that demilitarization across Eastern Europe 
would not only be desirable in its own right but would facilitate 
democratic reform efforts in the countries located there, I fear that 
13. See Lloyd Cutler and Herman Schwartz, Constitutional Reform in Czechoslovakia: 
E Duobus Unum?, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 511, 513-17, 519-20 (1991). 
14. Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
483. 494 (1991). 
15. ld. at 497. 
16. Id. 
17. ld. at 496. 
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what ultimately may prove to be unsuccessful efforts to achieve re-
gional demilitarization will be used as an excuse for failing to pro-
ceed firmly with the consolidation of internal reforms. Certainly 
internal reform ought not to be postponed while these nations await 
the arrival of demilitarization. Nor would it be wise, in my opinion, 
to draw attention away from necessary internal reforms to concen-
trate on international security arrangements. It is always easier, 
personally and nationally, to look outward rather than inward to 
solve enduring problems, but it is also less valuable in the long run. 
The threat of military confrontation is a major distraction from 
sound constitution-making that must be addressed, but taking on 
too much in that sphere should not be allowed to substitute for the 
painstaking construction of constitutional government. For now, 
"internal constitutional reform" is enough and should receive 
priority. 
The lesson to be drawn from a realistic understanding of the 
current Eastern European predicament is not one of despair but of 
recognition of the genuine elements that may jeopardize successful 
conversion to democratic, liberty-preserving politics, and a dedica-
tion to grappling with those problems. Positive factors supporting 
constitutional reform coexist with negative factors that stand in its 
way. Most fundamentally, the fresh air of freedom is blowing 
through the region and is being inhaled by broad segments of soci-
ety who yearn for more and are willing to work hard to keep it 
circulating. The momentum for establishing constitutional govern-
ment is abroad, not just in one nation, but in many, and it is sup-
ported by most of the world. The availability of modem 
communications technology increases the potential for sharing 
democratic hopes, successes, information, and ideas. With the end 
of the Cold War and the rapprochement between the United States 
and the countries comprising the former Soviet Union, more con-
structive uses of the diplomatic energies of the superpowers can be 
bent towards the support of burgeoning democracy. At the very 
least, Soviet power is no longer being deployed against democratic 
reform. If anything, the Soviet Union's successor nations have redi-
rected their energies towards liberalization. 
More tangibly, the international processes of the Western Eu-
ropean democracies are available to support-indeed in some in-
stances to demand-constitutional reform before lending assistance. 
Not only NATO and the EEC, but the European Court of Human 
Rights, the Council of Europe, and the European Commission of 
Human Rights, are available. The Czech and Slovak Federative 
Republic (CSFR), for one, has made it possible for their citizens to 
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petition the Commission by joining the Council, and the CSFR ap-
parently intends to "accede to the jurisdiction of the European 
Court" as well. Is Recently the Conference on Security and Cooper-
ation in Europe apparently agreed to improve the prospects for ad-
herence to the human rights obligations of the Helsinki Accords by 
authorizing fact-finding missions to investigate suspected human 
rights violations within member nations whenever ten member na-
tions or senior CSCE officials approved-although it stopped short 
of adopting more intrusive enforcement mechanisms. None of these 
international measures can or should operate in lieu of domestic 
mechanisms for policing government abuses, but they ought to but-
tress the adoption and execution of domestic constitutional reforms. 
Furthermore, the prospect of broader European economic integra-
tion cannot help but assist in the arduous transition to workable 
market economies. 
The hardships and tensions confronting the nations of Eastern 
Europe, as each moves at its own pace and in its own direction 
toward democratization, cannot easily be compared with the very 
different historical, social, and economic conditions of the Ameri-
can States during the period from 1776-1787 when they broke from 
Britain as a group, together fought a war for independence, and 
then struggled their way towards "a more perfect Union" embodied 
in the United States Constitution. Not the least of the differences is 
that the American States possessed market rather than planned so-
cialist economies and that the American States shared with Britain 
some democratic and libertarian traditions and codified some of 
those traditions in their own liberal constitutions at the moment of 
independence. Although both groups of new sovereigns gained in-
dependence from the hegemony of a previously controlling empire, 
the local embrace of communist control in Eastern Europe was cer-
tainly more pervasive than the colonial embrace of British control. 
The considerable room left to the geographically remote American 
colonies for developing democratic institutions has no counterpart 
in Eastern Europe, and a primary common language in the colonies 
surely facilitated those developments in a way that the linguistic 
barriers within and among the nations of Eastern Europe does not 
so readily allow. 
Yet, interestingly, despite the differences between these two 
otherwise strikingly disparate periods of constitutional creation, the 
initial thrust of their respective constitution-makers was and is to 
secure constitutional government primarily through reliance on a 
democratically elected legislative body. The first state constitutions 
18. Cutler and Schwartz, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 537 (cited in note 13). 
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following the Declaration of Independence from Great Britain 
wholly embraced popular sovereignty in the course of rejecting rule 
by the King, 19 just as a number of Eastern European nations appear 
to be embracing democratic legislative supremacy in the wake of 
arbitrary executive and judicial rule.2o Perhaps on this point East-
ern Europe can benefit from the American experience, for the early 
State constitutions were soon found wanting for lack of effectiveness 
in controlling legislative power. By the time the federal Constitu-
tion was formulated 11 years later, a stronger system of checks and 
balances, an increased role for courts in imposing constitutional re-
straints on legislative authority, and express provisions prohibiting 
certain kinds of legislative arbitrariness and regulation were all 
deemed necessary to preserve the constitutional freedoms of the 
populace.21 
When recent experience consists of executive and judicial au-
thority arrayed against political and individual liberty, it is under-
standable that the initial reaction is to rely on elected legislators to 
preserve democracy. As the American states learned, however, 
there are also significant risks in putting too many constitutional 
democratic eggs in one legislative basket. Reform, not rejection, 
proved to be the wiser course. A system of checks and balances 
prominently featuring an independent judiciary proved to hold the 
best hope of subjecting all government officials, including legislative 
officials, to the rule of law. 
In the course of my comments about the nature of constitu-
tional democracy and the internal and international context within 
which Eastern European efforts at constitutional creation must take 
place, I have suggested a number of specific provisions that appear 
crucial to the success of the enterprise at hand. It would be arro-
gant, and in any event beyond the scope of this discussion and my 
ability, to suggest a detailed constitutional document that is best for 
each of the diverse nations that comprise Eastern and Central Eu-
rope. Certainly no one constitution would serve all equally well. 
Nor would I contend that every feature of the United States 
Constitution, or even all of its major elements, should be adopted. 
19. See Herman Belz, Constitutionalism and the American Founding, in 2 Encyclopedia 
of the American Constitution 480, 483-84 (MacMillan, 1986). 
20. See, e.g., Cutler and Schwartz, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 551 (cited in note 13) (noting 
that President Havel's proposals for "direct election of the president and the expansion of 
presidential powers run counter to the parliamentary tradition of Czechoslovakia's earlier 
democratic experience, and to the widespread concern about a return of dictatorship"); 
Rapaczynski. 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 623-25 (cited in note 9) (discussing the "Polish Preference 
for a Powerful Legislature"); Summary Report of Proceedings at 10 (cited in note 4) (noting 
the Romanian draft Constitution's "tilt in favor of the legislative branch"). 
21. See Belz. 2 Encyclopedia of the American Constitution at 484 (cited in note 19). 
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The United States is a federal nation, unlike the majority of nations 
in this region, and even the survival as federal nations of the CSFR, 
the former USSR, and Yugoslavia is uncertain. Apart from the rel-
evance of constitutional provisions concerning federalism, some 
very basic questions of constitutional organization at the national 
level sensibly could be resolved in ways quite different from the 
American resolution. Powerful arguments have been made, for ex-
ample, that parliamentary systems are more likely to secure democ-
racy than presidential systems, especially in times of regime 
transition and under conditions of a polarized, volatile electorate.22 
The American success story is explained as an exception to a domi-
nant historical pattern of greater stability and flexibility under par-
liamentary systems, which are said to be more effective at 
responding to crises without the higher risk of "regime crisis" sup-
posedly presented by presidential governments.23 
A second major point of choice is whether legislative elections 
ought to be based on the principle of majoritarian or proportional 
representation. I tend to agree with Professor Rapaczynski's cri-
tique24 of the Polish preference for proportional representation-
especially with his view that it is preferable that political coalitions 
be constructed before elections, as majoritarian representation sys-
tems encourage, rather than after elections, as is more likely in a 
proportional representation system. Nonetheless, I know of no rea-
son to assume that constitutional democracy cannot succeed under 
a system of proportional representation. Universal adult suffrage 
with guarantees that each person's vote counts equally with every 
other person's may be a prerequisite of a properly egalitarian consti-
tutional democracy, but majoritarian representation, even if prefer-
able, is not. 
Having made these disclaimers, and with no pretense of being 
exhaustive, there are several elements I would urge as central to 
establishing a well-functioning constitutional democracy. Some are 
specific to federal systems. Some are vital to any constitutional de-
mocracy, federal or unitary. 
Federal systems are worth establishing and preserving for sev-
eral reasons, including the crucial reason that citizens may look to 
local power to resist central government abuse and to central gov-
ernment power to resist local government abuse.2s A successful 
federal system will accommodate diversity without threatening 
22. An excellent presentation of this view can be found in Juan J. Linz, The Perils of 
Presidentialism. I Journal of Democracy 51 (1990). 
23. ld. at 65. 
24. Rapaczynski, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 616-21 (cited in note 9). 
25. See Amar, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 497-506 (cited in note 14). See also Michael W. 
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unity. To maximize the advantages of unification and diversifica-
tion, and to resolve the tensions between them, is a formidable task, 
however, and three successful features of the United States Consti-
tution furnish a valuable paradigm. 
First, Article IV of the Constitution, the States' Relations Arti-
cle, contains a variety of measures mandating cooperation among 
the constituent States, obligating the central government to protect 
their democratic integrity, and guaranteeing citizens in each that 
they will not suffer unwarranted discrimination when they enter 
and operate in any other State.z6 Provisions designed to inculcate 
the reality of being bound together in a common nation are abso-
lutely essential to a federal system. The guarantee of interstate 
equality embodied in Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause, 
moreover, is not only designed to enhance political union but to 
secure equal treatment of individuals regardless of where they live 
in that union.21 The notion that an interstate or inter-republic 
equality provision is crucial to political unification also may in-
crease the likelihood that other proposals aimed at binding the na-
tional and constituent governments to provide equal protection of 
the laws to their own citizens will be more readily appreciated on 
similar grounds of moral fairness and political integration. The 
more occasions for recognizing the appeal of equality, the more 
likely it is that the populace will become habituated to equality 
values. 
Second, freedom of movement, temporary or indefinite, from 
one part of a federal nation to another must be guaranteed as a basic 
right. In addition to the obvious liberty dimension of that right, its 
protection will invigorate the competitive incentive for a federal na-
tion's constituent governments to foster conditions that will at a 
minimum not drive its people to go elsewhere. That incentive, in 
turn, should provide the populace with a better, less stagnant set of 
living choices.zs 
Third, Article VI of the U.S. Constitution mandates that the 
federal constitution, federal laws, and treaties "shall be the Supreme 
Law of the Land" before which conflicting state law must fall. The 
McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1484, 1504-07 
(1987). 
26. See generally Jonathan D. Varat, Economic Integration and Interregional Migration 
in the United States Federal System ("Economic Integration"), in Mark Tushnet, ed., Com-
parative Constitutional Federalism: Europe and America 44-45 (Greenwood Press, 1990) 
("Comparative Constitutional Federalism"). 
27. See Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 487 (1981 ). 
28. Varat, Economic Integration, in Tushnet, ed., Comparative Constitutional Federal-
ism at 34 (cited in note 26). 
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Supremacy Clause is a necessary rule of conflict resolution that per-
mits local law to experiment and operate unless and until the na-
tional representatives of the people, or the fundamental law of their 
Constitution, indicate that national interests require a uniform gov-
erning rule. Without it, political unification is seriously endan-
gered. That is why it is so disappointing to learn that the Czech and 
Slovak Federative Republic is unlikely to adopt a similar provi-
sion.29 Given the presence of democratic opportunities to change or 
abandon uniform national rules, and to amend the Constitution, 
there is normally no justification for extralegal measures, and as be-
tween the choice of national or local law, the law of the more 
broadly represented constituency has the greater claim to 
legitimacy. 
Even within a unitary government, supremacy of the Constitu-
tion as paramount law is vital to the ability of the people to control 
their elected or appointed government agents. Executive, adminis-
trative, legislative, or judicial action-all must be conducted within 
the limits of constitutional authorization. Constitutional limitations 
must be understood as binding law, not just aspirational ideals. 
Their designation in the nation's fundamental document as supreme 
and binding law facilitates the successful checking of those officials 
who would be tempted to intrude on power allocated elsewhere in 
government or on protected freedoms. The commitment of all to 
abide by the Constitution is most effective when it is a commitment 
to the rule of law that places certain actions beyond the realm of 
acceptability and beyond the reach of ordinary politics to authorize. 
An independent judiciary not beholden to any other officials 
for their tenure or compensation can be used, of course, as one 
method of enforcing the Constitution as supreme, binding law. 
Sometimes it may be the only effective method of checking the inva-
sion of the rights of unpopular or powerless minorities. Even if that 
enforcement power is withheld from the judiciary-an unfortunate 
choice, I think-the paramount law status of constitutional princi-
ples remains important as a guide to those, including the electorate, 
who do possess enforcement power. 
Of separate import, an independent judiciary is essential for the 
interpretation and application of nonconstitutionallaw as well. Un-
impeded opportunity to manipulate and compromise the integrity 
of law, whatever its source or status, could not be more corrosive of 
constitutional democracy. In short, the repeated calls for the estab-
lishment of independent judiciaries in Eastern Europe are sound no 
matter what the law the judiciary is asked to enforce, and even 
29. Cutler and Schwartz, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 528-29 (cited in note 13). 
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more compelling when the judiciary is charged with constitutional 
enforcement. 
Because armed organizations pose a special potential danger to 
democratic freedom, it is also critical that democratic constitutions 
provide for control of military and paramilitary organizations by 
electorally accountable civilian representatives. Again the aim is to 
control the people's agents so that they carry out democratic policy 
rather than making and enforcing their own. The reported inten-
tions of Hungary and Romania to require parliamentary authoriza-
tion for military deployment are promising first steps in this 
direction.3o 
One right that ought not to be included in a federal constitu-
tion is the right of a constituent government to secede. The Soviet 
Constitution includes that right; Croatia and Slovenia have created 
one for themselves; and a draft of the Slovak constitution would do 
the same.3' It is not that secession will, or necessarily ought to be 
prevented by omitting a constitutional right to secede. Rather, as 
Professor Sunstein argues, "constitutional recognition of the right 
to secede" threatens "ordinary democratic processes" by diverting 
attention from the substance of policy, allowing "minority vetoes on 
important issues," and encouraging destructive strategic behavior.32 
As he urges, "waiver of the right to secede should be seen as a natu-
ral part of constitutionalism. "33 
The right to amend the Constitution is quite a different story. 
If a constitution is to express the fundamental principles of demo-
cratic organization and human liberty within the bounds of which 
democratic policymaking is to occur, it should not be as readily 
amendable as ordinary legislation. On the other hand, providing 
for the power to amend through a supermajoritarian process, in or-
der to reflect changes in the society's fundamental values or to cor-
rect judicial or other official interpretations at odds with widespread 
views of what the Constitution does or should mean, leaves open 
the necessary avenue for peaceful evolution instead of violent 
revolution. This is precisely what Article V of the U.S. Constitu-
tion does. 
In paying some attention to Article IV regarding relations 
among States, the amendment process addressed in Article V, and 
the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, I deliberately have sought to 
supplement the more frequently noted features of the separation of 
30. See Amar, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 509 n.84 (cited in note 14). 
31. Sunstein, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 634 nn.5 and 6 (cited in note I). 
32. ld. at 670. 
33. ld. 
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the legislative, executive, and judicial branches in Articles I, II, and 
Ill, and the Bill of Rights Amendments that followed the Constitu-
tion adopted at Philadelphia. Having filled in some blanks, let me 
briefly return to the question of what personal rights it is wise to 
include and exclude from the basic constitutional document. The 
centrality of freedoms of speech, press, political association, reli-
gion, and privacy has already been affirmed. Procedural freedoms 
that are antidotes to the risk of arbitrary incarceration are equally 
vital. These would include a number of components of fair process 
for defending oneself against criminal charges. 
What all of these freedoms generally have in common, whether 
substantive or procedural, is that they are shields against the de-
ployment of coercive government power. By contrast, several of 
the draft Eastern European constitutions also contain provisions 
purporting to guarantee affirmative or welfare rights, such as em-
ployment, education, and medical care. These include Czechoslo-
vakia,34 Poland,3s and Romania.36 Though perhaps not surprising 
for nations habituated to socialist experience, they raise potentially 
profound issues regarding the status of constitutional rights as le-
gally binding obligations. Even in the Czechoslovakian form of 
split-level rights, under which those rights designed to keep govern-
ment at bay are fully enforceable as a matter of constitutional law 
and those obligating government to provide affirmative support are 
only enforceable through implementing legislation,37 the risk that 
"constitutional rights" will be understood generically, and will 
sometimes not be understood as enforceable law, poses real con-
cerns about nonenforcement when the occasion is more compelling 
and the conditions for judicial enforcement are more realistic. Fur-
thermore, principled arguments support reserving budgetary alloca-
tion decisions for democratic politics rather than constitutional 
law.3s At the very least, one ought to think very seriously about 
how belief in constitutional law may be affected generally by 
promises that are not likely to be kept before enshrining such social 
rights in a constitution. 
A thriving constitutional democracy is one in which constitu-
34. See Cutler and Schwartz, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 535-36 (cited in note 13). 
35. See Rapaczynski, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 611-13 (cited in note 9); Comments on the 
Draft Polish Constitution, American Bar Association Central and East European Law Initia-
tive (CEELI) 4-5 (July 5, 1991). 
36. See Summary Report of Proceedings at 2-3 (cited in note 4). 
37. See Cutler and Schwartz, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 536 (cited in note 13). 
38. Compare Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Con-
stitution, 1979 Wash. U. L. Q. 695, with Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitu-
tional Democracy, 1979 Wash. U. L. Q. 659, and Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional 
Law 1336 (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1988). 
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tional norms are regularly and meaningfully enforced and the con-
tours of constitutional law are a routine part of public deliberation 
and dialogue. In that kind of political system, constitutional law is 
a common language binding people together, whatever the other 
linguistic or cultural barriers that divide them. The value of that 
common language, together with more observably tangible enforce-
ment benefits, leads me to two final suggestions. 
The first, primarily to guard against the most dangerous invo-
cations of coercive government power, is to provide a constitutional 
guarantee of independent judicial review of individual claims of ille-
gal detention. The model in mind originated in the English writ of 
habeas corpus, the minimum function of which is to assure an avail-
able regular mechanism for reviewing the validity of confinement. 
The American Constitution provides that the "Great Writ" not be 
suspended unless necessary during rebellion or invasion,39 and 
although its supplemental scope may be left to legislative modifica-
tion, even in its most modest form it performs a valuable service in 
deterring and correcting instances of arbitrary imprisonment. 
The second proposal also draws on the American experience. 
Contrary to the centralized forums of judicial review adopted in 
most European countries, I would urge consideration of a decen-
tralized, fully integrated system of judicial review, in which courts 
or other adjudicative bodies at every level possess the jurisdiction, 
and assume the obligation, to measure any contested official act 
against the requirements of the Constitution. When constitutional 
issues are potentially part of any adjudicative proceeding, citizen 
access to constitutional enforcement mechanisms multiplies and the 
intersection of constitutional and nonconstitutional law becomes 
more vivid.40 
Some sort of Supreme Court would be needed to resolve con-
flicts in constitutional rulings at lower judicial levels, of course, but 
the existence of potentially differing rulings should provide in-
creased opportunities for reflection, debate, and attempts at persua-
sion concerning the resolution most consistent with the nation's 
particular commitments to constitutional and democratic values. 
The objective is not only more thoughtful resolution of potentially 
intractable issues, but education and participatory struggle within a 
tolerant, open democratic tradition. One should not underestimate 
39. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
40. Insofar as the Polish draft Constitution separates "judicial review of legislation 
from the review of the legality of executive and administrative action, vesting the latter power 
in a special Administrative Tribunal" and the former in the Constitutional Tribunal, see 
Rapaczynski, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 610 (cited in note 9), it sacrifices the benefits of an over-
view of the integrated legal system. In my view, that is unfortunate. 
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the value of providing real opportunities for the broad-based em-
brace of peaceful debate about the proper content of constitutional 
norms. 
To infuse a nation with habits of constitutionalism is an imper-
ative, if intangible goal. Beyond offering effective enforcement of 
constitutional principles, universal judicial review holds great 
promise in facilitating the adoption of constitutional law as a com-
mon language. It is a proposal deserving of serious examination. 
